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Urban Management Under Fiscal Stringency:
U.s, and Britain · .
Students of American urban politics who look beyond national
boundaries immediately observe certain similarities in popular
descriptions of American cities, and Great Britain as a whole,
Both northeast and midwestern U, S. · cities, and· the entire British .
polity, are regularly portrayed as being in chronic "decline,"
and periodically portrayed as being in "crisis." One· major
consequence of this matched pair of afflicted political units
is that both British and American cities have been early settings
for the "politics.of scarcity."
In this paper I will be reporting on some efforts at better
understanding the types of response which decision-makers in the
two societies use in responding to "decline" and "crisis," and
some of the variations between the societies which affect their
responses. In earlier work I have outlined a conceptual model of
patterns of managerial response to budgetary stringency in
American cities,1 and examined data on how local governments in
the two countries approach the budget-cutting task in practice, 2
In this paper I will be concentrating on variations in political
culture between American and British urban·governance, and the
impact these variations have on urban publ~_c management.
In comparing top-level national- administrators in the United
States and Great Britain, Richard Neustadt argued that the British
civil service was distinguished by a career structure which
promoted the development of "generalists" with broad experience in
administration, but also with detailed background work in the
political sector as well.3 The career structures of the civil
service provided opportunities to be confidential aides to government ministers without relinquishing civil service status. No
such opportunity structures existed in American politics, Neustadt
argued.
Thus, one fundamental facet of British public· administrafion
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is, in this view, leadership by a group of people who have worked
with each other for long periods of time, share common values and
.
.
experiences, but are not likely to be "technical experts." As
such, the leadership of national British administration appears
to fit with our standard.understandings of the operation of
British leadership patterns more generally. One of the "causes"
of the British crisis, it is frequently argued, is societal
undervaluing of technical expertise .as opposed to more prestigious
"generalist" training. 4
By contrast, British local government is reported'to have
been considerably more interested than central government in
encouraging its employees to obtain specific training in their
own specialized fields.5 This pattern in British local government
can hardly be explained by reference to the national "political
culture.
Indeed, British descriptions of British management
patterns often emphasize the distinction between the national
civil service and its traditions, and the very different recruitment patterns and traditions of local government service ._ 6
The separateness of these traditions in the U.K. can be
noted in the very language used to describe the respective institutions. In the United States, the term "civil service" covers
all bureaucratic systems, from federal to local. In the U.K.,
however, "civil servants" work only for the national government.
Comparable figures at subnational levels are "local government
officers." One recent study of the "British philosophy of
administrationll explj.citly excludes the operations of British
local government from its purview. 7
Any discussion of urban·management in Britain, therefore,
and any attempt to compare this system with American counterparts,
must begin with two cautions. Administration in Eritish local
government cannot be inferred from observations drawn from national
British experience, and variations within the patterns must be
anticipated, even when only the local level is being considered.
(In a very different context, Graham,Allison has warned us of our
(
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-3tendency to accept without question the existence.of varied
bureaucratic systems acting within our own country, but to begin
our analyses of other societies with implicit assumptions of
homogeneous national styles and purposes throughout that society's
bureaucracy.) 8 Within the United States, the very complexity and
variation in administrat'ive procedures has·been noted by one
classic study of comparative administration to be the "focal point
of American administrative dysfunctions. •• 9
Despite these caveats, there are certain regularities to
British and American urban administration, and contrasts which
can be drawn between them. In this paper I shall be outlining
some o; the variations between the settings in which American
and British urban managers must operate. I am doing this in the
context of a problem common to the two societies, pressures on
their urban governments to curtail public spending.
Any discussion of this variation must begin by noting the
variations between the two societies in public (and often elite)
perceptions of the origins of the "crisis." As I mentioned above,
an observer who compares the two .countries is often struck by the
similarities in the descriptions of the ailments of older American
cities, on the one hand, and the entire British polity, on the
other. While the complaints (and sometimes the suggested remedies)
sound similar, their differing foci of attention produce different
impacts on urban-administration. In the American context, I have
argued, much of the "urban crisis" is perceived to be distinctive
to the particular communities undergoing the "crisis." Thus,
newspaper commentary on the New York fiscal crisis (and much
academic interpretation as well) pointed toward New York's
distinctive municipal spending patterns. 10 More recent analyses
of Cleveland's difficulties have concentrated their attention on
the personalities of particular individuals in the community
political leadership structure. 11
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Perceptions of crisis origins as peculiar to the community
involved focus attention on the peculiarities of· that community.
In the case of New York, this led to national attention to the
service mix of New York City, and comparisons of this service mix
with that found in other large American cities. Certain features
of New York City's spending and revenue-raising practices were
widely perceived to be unique, and national government pressure
was brought to bear to bring New York City into line" with the
range of services (and public employee benefits) found elsewhere.
Managers in New York were not only under pressure to reduce their
total expenditures, but were under rather explicit instructions
about spending priorities as well, often from sources external to
the city political structure.
The British case was different. Since the crisis itself
is largely seen in national terms1f there is little.political
incentive to seek out patterns of local distinctiveness.•
·National efforts concentrate on overall spending control.
While some discussion takes place about the 1spending priori ties
of local authorities (usually centering on housing expenditures~13
control of local government expenditure is but one element. of a
larger constellation of problems. In this larger universe,
central government efforts to alter the priorities of individual
local authorities inevitably take a secondary position.
Under such•. circumstances, we would expect local authorities
in Britain, and those who manage their expenditures, to be "freer
to continue with their own spending priorities than would their
American counterparts in "fiscal crisis" communities. Examination
of changes in spending patterns in three London Boroughs, and
comparison of these patterns with alterations of New York City s
1
spending patterns, shows that this is indeed so. 14
Thus, the first major variation in American and British
responses to urban fiscal stringency can be found in differences
in perception of the "causes" of the crises. The pattern of
perception found in Britain leaves its local public sector managers
under less constraint than in the United States.
11

11

0

-5A second major variation between·the two countries can be
found in the differing ways in which urban public services are
funded in the tr .s. and Brit·ain. · I suggest that particular
attention needs to be. paid to the much greater reliance on
central government "revenue sharing" in the U.K. than in the U.S.
Douglas Ashford has shown that a much greater share of central
government aid qomes in unrestricted form in the U.K. than.in
the u.s. 15 While the overall percentage of local expenditure
which comes from central government sources is less in the U.S.
than in the U.K., 16 this is probably not true for "fiscal crisis"
central ' cities in the U.S., .which have come to rely upon federal·
aid for disproportionately large shares of their revenues, in
· comparison with other American local governments~ 17
In fact, a mere comparison of the available data on these
points understates the difference. It is necessary to understand
not only the extent to which unrestricted (as opposed to earmarked)
national funds are available to local governments, but also the extent
to which the provision of such funds has become routinized. The
use of the Rate Support Grant has now become an accepted part of
the British political process. This does not mean that no debate
about it takes place, but rather that controversy centers around
the funding formula, not the existence of the aid program itself. 18
While central governments can and do alter the RSG formula for
their own programmatic purposes; they really canno-t control what
local authorities do with the funds they receive, nor can central
government credibly threaten to eliminate the payments.
In the United States, revenue sharing remains a new and uncertain program. As experiences witn the Anti-Recession Fiscal
Assistance Program demonstrate- local governments in the United
States cannot be assured of comparable sums of fede-ral assistance
from one year to the next. 19 Thus, not only is a greater proportion of central government aid in the U.S. in the form of programspecific grants, but even that portion of federal funding which is
1

-
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unrestricted in nature. comes under political circumstances which
must make American urban administrators wary of relying too
heavily on its continuation. This second variation in American
and British patterns also suggests greater relative freedom for
British urban administrators than would be true in the American
situation •
A third variation can be found in the formal constitutional
arrangements of the two societies. The amount of external control
to which American urban managers are subject is enhanced by the
American system. ·While it is of course true that Britain is a
legally unitary system in which central government has sovereign
powers over its municipalities while the American federal government does not, the role of state governments in the United States
provides another setting for constraint to be imposed on American
urban managers.· State assertion of authority is by no means a
purely theoretical matter. Longstanding political traditions in
many American states (reinforced by cultural attitudes and the
historical Bgacy of anti-urban apportionment patterns in state
legislatures) lead to recurring state control of American local
governments which are far more detailed than those exercised by
British central government over British local authorities.
All of the variations described above are external to urban
management itself. They are factors which influence the managerial
environment, but they are not themselves the product of managerial
attitudes. There is an additional set of Anglo-American variations,
however, which is more directly attributable to differences in the
position of- and attitude toward management per~ in the two
societies.
One of the most crucial variations is the difference between
Britain and the United States in the esteem with which private
management is held. Criticisms of British private management are
part of both the popular culture and much academic discussion of
British societal difficulties. 20 There is little underlying public
belief, so widespread in the United States, that the private
sector is somehow inherently more efficient than the public. 21

-7Thus, the notion that "business management can save the c.ities"
is an unlikely political theme in Britain, but a regular part of
both political rhetoric, and actual attempts at administrative
implementation, in the United States. 22
·
This Anglo-American distinction has·significant consequences
for urban public sector managers. The "risk" of lateral importation of business figures into the public sector is far higher
.
.
23
for American urban bureaucrats than is true in England.
(Without
_entering the usually polemical debate over the informal influence
of business "elites" on urban decision-making, it is clear that
this possibility is far weaker in a society such as Britain, where
the presuppositions which support such influence are much weaker.· 24
This does not suggest that such influence is nonexistent in Britain,
only that from the perspective of public sector local government
officials interested in "defending their turf,I' the.risks of
"intruders" are less.)
Just as cultural values about private and public sectors
reinforce the relatively greater autonomy of British urban administrators in times of budgetary stringency, so too do the organizational arrangements of the administrators themselves. British
administrators, organized into national bodies based on both
technical skill and official qualifications, are far better
defended than are America~ administrators, whose national links
are weaker, and whose own careers may be more directlr tied to
the communities in which they serve. Lateral movement of ambitious
American administrators is made difficult by the size of the
country and the "anarchy" of urban recruitment systems. By
contrast, British administrators' credentials will be honored
throughout the country, and most -promotional possibilities will
be nationally advertised. Both legal barriers and political
traditions make British urban administrators better insulated
from reprisals by their own political superiors than would be
true in many American cities. The necessity of keeping up
positive relationships within any particular urban system should
be less strong for a British administrator, therefore, than for
an American one.
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(This pattern of strong national professional associations is reinforced by the patterns of national public· sector collective
bargaining in Britain. Absence of individual community collective
'-..
bargaining in the U.K. removes a strain on relationships, particularly in times -of budgetary stringency.)
I
.
These national patterns are rooted in the "specialist" nature
of British local government administration. As I suggested earlier,
local authority service varies considerably from the central government's civil service patterns. Recruitment and advancement within_
any particular sector of local government depends largely on the
posession of the specific academic_and technical qualifications
of that policy area, and higher-level posit1.ons usually require
prior local government experience. Such a career pattern, rooted
more in the specialization itself than in the particular local
government one is employed by, makes possible the type of lateral
movement described above. 25
Equally importantly, it provides·a "defense" of the specialization against the lateral entry of "unqualified" outsiders. As I
indicated above, lateral entry of business figures into government
is less likely in Britain than in the United States, because .of
the differing climates of national opinion about the relative
efficiency of public and private sectors. Within Britain itself,
entry of business.figures is more likely into central government
than into local authorities. 26 The "specialist" credentials so
critical for local government advancement are unlikely to be
posessed by any significant number of British business figures. 27
Thus, the structural arrangements of local government service
reinforce the cultural values of the society, and both make local
government officers in Britain b'etter defended against outsiders
than is true for urban bureaucrats in the United States.
What, then, can we anticipate to be the differences in
·managerial response to "fiscal crisis" in the two societies? I
have elsewhere suggested a variety of different strategies which
American urban administrators might use in dealing with fiscal
stringency. 28 My central assumption was that chronic budgetary

•,

shortages would not reduce managerial ambition. Indeed, once
"budget crisis" came to be seen as a•widespread phenomenon,
ambitious managers might seek to "make a name" for ·themselves
precisely by their abilities to manage under such circumstances.
These descriptions were, however, rooted in American entrepreneurial traditions., I argued that such traditions, particularly
in the private sector, could spill over into public policymaking
in circumstances of fiscal stringency.
'rhere are a number of reasons not to expect such responses
to be as significant in British urban administration. As I
suggested above, there are a number of reasons·why British urban
administrators are less likely to be under external pressure than
their American- counterparts, and they are better defended against
such pressure ·if and when it occurs. In addition, the part-time
nature of local government elected officials in Britain makes it
unlikely that they can be serious rivals for the professionals
· in determining day-to-day administrative decisions. Weaker
traditions of investigative reporting about local government, 29
make less likely the type of expose which can weaken the independence and ~utonomy of American urban bureaucrats.
Thus, British urban administrators are able to remain more
autonomous in determining priorities in response to fiscal crisis
than American administrators are able to be. As a result, we .
should anticipate considerably less variation from status quo ant~priorities in U.K. local government than in American. If local
administrators in England are reasonably well protected against
external control of their own decision-making, we should anticipate
that they will also be less likely to alter their own standing
decisions. American urban administrators, in cities with "fiscal
crises,'' can expect to have all sorts of outsiders "looking over
their shoulders" and evaluating their responses.
This external examination, in the American case, often begins
with a presupposition that the origins of the problem can be found
in the mistaken spending policies of the community involved, an
attitude which must surely increase the severity of the external
scrutiny. What is perhaps equally important, the more fluid

administrative structures of American cities makes possible
the actual supplanting of administrators by outsiders believed
to be more compentent and "prudent."
In most of the literature on governmenta·1 budgeting only
incremental changes from the previous year's budgets are reported.
One of the major explanations of the utility of this type of
decision-making is that it"':eases the burdens on administrative.
decision-makers. 30 Environments of budgetary stringency do
challenge some of the assumptions upon which that standard view
is based.
When we examine how administrators behave, we need to
consider not only the internal administrative-advantages of adhering
closely to the status guo~ante, but also the extent to which
administrators see themselves to be free from or constrained by
external pressure to change priorities. It has been the argument
of this paper that British urban administrators have greater
autonomy under these circumstances than is true in the United
States, and examination of budgetary data from the largest cities
in the two countries tends to confirm this view. 31
I should mention that internal British analyses have argued
from somewhat different perspectiyes. Most·commentary emphasizes
the growing constraint on British local government. This constraint
is depicted in two rather different ways. One type of analys'is
puts primary emphasis on increases in· direct central government
control of British local authorities. 32 Particular attention is
called to the use of "cash limits," in which central government
aid programs have ceilings placed upon them in any given fiscal
year, and.the usual adjustments for inflation are not a basis for
upward changes in aid amounts. Changes in the Rate Support Grant
formula itself gives central government a considerable weapnn. to
use against recalcitrant local authorities.
But despite these real constraints, it has been the argument
of this paper that British local authorities have retained relatively greater freedom than American "fiscal crisis" cities, and
have retained relatively greater ability to control their own.
priority-setting, within the limits of central government aid.
.

'
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Despite government indications of displeasure, local authorities
have retained full ability to raise additional revenue on their
own, if they are willing to accept the political costs of
raising their own property taxes.33
In addition to· emphasizing the role of direct central
. government constraints,· many British analysts have dir·ected their
attention to the perceived. growth of "corporatism, and have
argued that this too cons-ti tu tes a growing limit on the freedom of
decision of local governments, and those who manage them. The
concept of "corporatism," usually used iri a pejorative context,
suggests that tripartite arrangements of government, big business,
and large labor unions in fact take collective decisions on major
points in the national economy.3 4 Since local government expenditure is such a point, it too is subject tb the influence of
corporatism.
Whatever the merits of this view, there.is no inherent
reason why the growth of collective decision-making across a variety
of governmental and industrial sectors necessarily rerluces the
autonomy of local government vis a vis central government. If
such patterns do indeed grow, and this itself is by no means
certain, the relative power of all levels of government as
independent "sovereign" powers might be reduced, however.
The growth of concern about corporatism, and its possible
risks for democratic decision-making, fit a more widespread
pattern of critical analyses of British political systems. This
changing trend can be observed in American analyses of Britain
as ·well. Long-standing trends in American political discussion·
have presented British experiences as models-to be emulated. 35
Samuel Huntington hassuggested that this pattern of emulation
can be traced back to the origins of the American republic. 36
More recently, however, the British experience has been
presented as a model to be avoided. One early sign of this
changing fashion can be found in the generally cool analyses
. of British urban reorganizations as possible models for American
cities.3 7 More recent commentary has centered on British difficulties
11

-12in maintaining a wide range of urban public services. 38
The argument of this paper has been somewhat different. I
have suggested that local government elites in Britain have
been better able to retain freedom of choice in· setting local
government priorities than have some comparable American actors,
but I have.attributed these differences to variations in both the
structural setting of British local government, and more broadly
cultural attitudes about business and government in the U.K.
Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing depends on one's
perspective about the policy outputs of the local governments
involved. It does suggest, however, that the formal centralism
·of British government has not resulted in the elimination of
local government autonomy,· even under· circumstances of severe·
fiscal stringency.
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